豬頭的英文論文動工啦～～

豬頭開始修改論文了。光重寫底下《Introduction》這幾個段落就改了三天。英文寫作變得有點卡，但是心情倒是蠻興奮的。明天開始修改《第一章》囉～～（其實是論文的第二章，第一章被審查人建議全部刪除！！豬頭花了這些年才好不容易接受這個建議。冏～～）
這個連結是日本外交部網頁的Q&A（點進），有興趣日本戰後議題（教科書、慰安婦）的同學，可以進去看看。豬頭上週末才發現的。

On April 22, 2005, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi apologized for his country’s aggression in Asia during World War II at a summit of Asian and African leaders in Jakarta, Indonesia. “In the past, Japan through its colonial rule and aggression caused tremendous damage and suffering for the people of many countries, particularly those of Asian nations,” said Koizumi, “With feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved on our minds, Japan has resolutely maintained consistently since the end of World War II that it will be an economic power and never a military one, and that it will adhere to its principle of resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of force.” Just hours before Koizumi’s speech, members of the Japanese parliament nevertheless made a pilgrimage to the Yasukuni shrine, where they honored executed World War II criminals along with other war dead. China soon expressed strong dissatisfaction over the actions of the Japanese politicians and dismissed Koizumi’s apology, asserting that “actions are more important.” China demanded that Japan correct its written history, and that Koizumi condemn the Japanese parliamentarians for their visit to the shrine. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan [MOFA] later in October 2005 officially announced a statement clarifying the erroneous picture of seeing these Yasukuni visits as an attempt to glorify Japanese militarism.

Many Mainlanders in Taiwan righteously criticized the Japanese government persistently incapable of dealing with residual issues connected to the War, like dead soldiers, wartime sex slaves, and the massacre of Taiwanese aborigines. They argued that all Chinese people should join together to oppose to Japan’s attempt to whitewash its bloody past and to demand that Japan squarely correct its version of the history of Nanjing Massacre. They thus consider this event to be an opportunity for the Taiwanese to sympathize with Mainland Chinese over the abuse they both suffered. Much to their surprises, the Taiwanese government and the ethnic Taiwanese remained silent during the Chinese demonstrations. This is difficult for Mainlanders in Taiwan to understand that the involvement of the colonized Taiwanese with WWII – not only politically but also emotionally – is nevertheless a much more complicated issue that they may imagine:

First, while the Taiwanese had been colonized as secondary citizens and suffering from the wartime conscription for Japan’s military expansionism; however, Taiwan’s pre-modern living conditions including public security, railroads, sewage systems, education, and rice and sugar industries had all developed under the Japanese. As I shall discuss later, there was a feeling that the new regime after the retrocession compared unfavorably with the old. As Homi Bhabha claims, “[h]ybridity is the revaluation of the assumption of colonial identity through repetition of discriminatory identity effects” (1994:112). The colonial history of Taiwan is an experiential history of hybrid cultural identification. Facing such cognitive complexity as they did – the idea of “Japan” referred simultaneously to a cruel invader and a benevolent builder of Taiwanese infrastructure, while “China” meant both the corrupt Nationalist government and a helpless, sympathetic victim of international aggression. Additionally, complicating this cognition is the emphasis on temporality in Taiwanese society. The residents, especially those of the younger generation, who lack a certain worldview due to chronic domestic political conflicts and long-term international diplomatic isolation, are headed for a potential crisis in comprehending transnational and cross-regional history and current events throughout the world.

Second, the Mainlanders’ awakening argument with regard to Nanjing Massacre overlooks the fact that Taiwan’s own experience of massacre was at the hands of the Chinese Nationalists, not the Japanese. Taiwanese people may have a very different association with the tragic Massacre (their knowledge of which, if any, was gleaned from textbooks). During the White Terror period in Taiwan, the history textbooks ruled by the Nationalist government strongly denounced the ferocious Japanese militarists and mourned for the Chinese victims of mass killings, but yet simultaneously concealed the dead in the February 28 Incident. Indeed, Hiatt’s criticism is also valid for Taiwan; its February 28 Incident, accompanied by the March massacre (1947), had been excluded from official histories for forty years, during which Taiwanese had been forced to accustom themselves to remaining silent. In the long run, the Taiwanese are dubious about the said and the unsaid. The attitude of Taiwanese toward the understanding of the February 28 Incident is hence more concerned with allowable and discussable forums rather than the debatable truth of the Incident itself – this is a part of Taiwan’s cultural expression, a way to celebrate the relocated historical significance of the Incident “without opening up wounds for the families of the victims,” as director Hou says in the passage quoted in a latter chapter.

Finally, the Yasukuni visits involving with the East Asian political tensions have put Taiwan in an extremely awkward predicament, which leads the government seemingly to adopt an ambiguous diplomatic strategy, thereby avoiding being labeled as pro-reunification with the hostile China or destabilizing the semi-governmental alignment with Japan. （本來這兒還要寫釣魚台的台灣「嘴炮式」表態立場。想想還是算了，寫不完了。）There was thus no political imperative for the Taiwan government to side with the Chinese demonstrators: China had just passed its “anti-secession law” on March 14 (2005), which officially authorizes the use of force against Taiwan if Taiwan proclaims independence. Furthermore, it was understood that Koizumi had made his speech about Japan’s pledge to stick to a peaceful path and its increasing involvement in overseas development at a summit conference with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annanin furtherance of Japan’s campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a position held now only by China, the US, Russia, Britain and France. China’s demonstrations over the Japanese textbook more or less prevented Tokyo from gaining a permanent seat.